Ford Motor Credit Reaffirmation Agreement

These courts also assert that the plain language of section 365(p) supports the conclusion that the debt underlying a capital lease must be reaffirmed under the following section 524(c): „Section 365(p)(2) uses the language of acceptance, but acceptance is not self-fulfilling. . . . On the contrary, [section 365(p)] indicates that, under certain conditions, the responsibility of the lease is assumed, indicating that liability is more necessary to assume liability. „Id. at 827-28 (added highlighting). This „a little extra,“ these jurisdictions conclude, is full compliance with the requirements of Section 524(c). See id.; See also In re Creighton, 427 B.R.

24, 28 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2007). 14. In a related argument, Ms. Roberson asserted that under section 12-1021(h) of CLEC, a debtor in default of payment may take back a car that the creditor has repossessed simply by offering „the amount due under the agreement at the time of repayment, without giving effect to a provision allowing for acceleration.“ The fact that Ms. Roberson would have been in a better position if she had fallen behind monetary, namely the long-awaited amount, does not change our analysis.

An amicus curiae coalition, consisting of Civil Justice, Inc., the Maryland Cash Campaign, the Public Justice Center, the Maryland Legal Aid Bureau, Inc., and the University of Maryland School of Consumer Protection Clinic, refers us to an unpublished statement from a Pennsylvania court, Malachin v. Daimler Chrysler Financial Services, 2007 Pa. Dist. -Cnty. Dez. LEXIS 158 (2007), where the creditor reconstituted a car when a debtor went bankrupt and did not confirm the debt. The court interpreted a law prohibiting „acceleration“ when a creditor claims to be „uncertain“: no tempered purchase contract can include an acceleration clause according to which part or all of the balance of time represented by payments not yet due can be immediately declared payable because the seller or the holder believes himself uncertain. The court held that „as the defendant was not late outside the filing of the insolvency application, he was not entitled to recover the vehicle“. One of them prohibits both acceleration and „recovery“ and the other prohibits „accelerating“ due to uncertainty. Given that we assume that the legislator acted with full knowledge of the legislation in force, namely the language of the „withdrawal“ and „acceleration“ of RISA Section 12-607 (a), Malachin is not convincing. The Amici also claim that Chapter 404 of the Maryland Statutes of 1993 was rejected by some creditors, as evidenced by a letter from Charles W.

Turnbaugh, Senior Vice President and General Counsel of Loyola Federal Savings Bank, stating that „the heavy penalties imposed for non-compliance with Subtitles 9 and 10 of Title 12, Loyola and other lenders could clearly cost.“ While lenders may have seen the OPEC and clec changes unfavorable, there is no specific reference letter to the ban on „acceleration“ for reasons of uncertainty in CLEC Section 12-1023 or OPEC Section 12-923, as they could also prevent creditors from resuming service in the face of uncertainty. . . .